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T ypically, the debate over
NAFTA has focused on jobs.
However, to really understand
NAFTA’s effects on employment
or living standards, it is
important to first answer the 
more fundamental question of
what effect it has had on trade.
The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment has been one of the most hotly debated
trade accords in recent history. NAFTA’s critics
regard the expansion of free trade to a devel-
oping country like Mexico as a dangerous
precedent. They envision U.S. jobs lost in a
flood of goods from a country with an average
wage one-fifth that of the United States. Others
see NAFTA as a boon to U.S. employment and
living standards through greater trade and
investment opportunities.
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These opposing expectations for NAFTA
have been largely matters of speculation and
based on assessments of other trade accords. But
now that NAFTA has been in operation for more
than three years, the question is not what the
trade accord is likely to do but what it has done.
Typically, the debate over NAFTA has
focused on jobs. However, to really understand
NAFTA’s effects on employment or living stan-
dards, it is important to first answer the 
more fundamental question of what effect it 
has had on trade. Changes in trade patterns
caused by a lowering of trade barriers are ulti-
mately the mechanism by which jobs and living
standards are influenced. This article examines
how NAFTA, since its inception, has affected
trade between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico, holding constant other important fac-
tors that affect trade. Without controlling for
these other factors, the effects of NAFTA are
difficult to discern, which can lead to wrong or
conflicting conclusions about the accord’s
effects on trade.
In the three years since NAFTA’s imple-
mentation, both its supporters and opponents
have used changes in the pattern of trade flows
to justify their positions. Supporters have argued
that during 1994, the year NAFTA took effect,
U.S. trade with Mexico grew nearly 10 percent
faster than the average of the previous five years
(Figure 1). Opponents claim that any expansion
in trade in NAFTA’s first year was quickly
reversed when expectations about its benefits
fell to earth with the 1995 peso crisis. During
1995, U.S. imports from Mexico grew nearly 25
percent, but exports dropped 11 percent.
Since Mexico began to recover from its
deep recession in late 1995, U.S. exports to
Mexico have resumed rapid growth, but claim-
ing the success or failure of NAFTA based on a
superficial examination of the ups and downs 
of trade flows can be a mistake. The acccord’s
effects may be much more or less than a simple
glance at these flows would suggest because
NAFTA does not exist in an economic or policy
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Worldwide economic changes that likely
influenced bilateral trade within North
America were already under way when NAFTA
took effect. For example, U.S. real gross
domestic product increased 3.5 percent in
1994, influencing the United States’ supply and
demand for imports and exports worldwide.
As Figure 2 shows, U.S. trade with the world,
excluding Mexico and Canada, grew faster in
1994 than in the previous six years. Likewise,
Mexican real GDP increased 5.2 percent, and
the real value of the peso was quite high in
1994, both factors that would have boosted
U.S. exports to Mexico. As a result, it is
unlikely that NAFTA and its lower trade bar-
riers were the only influence on bilateral trade
flows. To isolate the effects of NAFTA, one
must account for the effects of changes in
income, exchange rates, and trade with other
countries; only then can NAFTA’s impact on
trade be ascertained.
In the first section of this article, I discuss
previous analyses of NAFTA and compare them
with my methodology. I next specify and esti-
mate a model of the accord’s effects on North
American trade flows, and I assess how much
trade has been influenced by NAFTA. I con-
clude by evaluating NAFTA’s success.
DETERMINING NAFTA’S EFFECTS
Because most studies of how NAFTA affects
jobs, trade, and incomes in North America were
completed just before, or shortly after, the
treaty’s implementation, the majority of them
are forward-looking. This contrasts with the
backward-looking approach of more recent
studies, including this one.
2 However, any
assessment of NAFTA’s effects, past or future,
must use an economic model to judge how
trade interacts with the larger economy.
The techniques used to determine
NAFTA’s future impact fall into two broad cate-
gories. First is the computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) modeling technique, in which
analysts model a simplified economy and simu-
late what would happen to it if tariffs and 
nontariff barriers fall according to the NAFTA
schedule.
3 Typically, CGE models are static—
that is, the structure of the economy cannot vary
over time in response to changing trade patterns.
More recently, however, a model by Kouparitsas
(1997) allows for changes in capital investment
and its reallocation across economic sectors and
countries over time. Allowing capital flows to
change over time in response to NAFTA gener-
ates a much larger benefit to freer trade.
Although these two types of studies make
different assumptions about the economy’s
structure and the degree of competition in vari-
ous sectors, both find an increase in income 
and trade under NAFTA. There is also substan-
tial agreement about how NAFTA will affect
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In gen-
eral, because Mexico’s is the smallest economy,
it reaps the largest benefit relative to its GDP
(Kehoe and Kehoe 1994). The United States
benefits modestly, and Canada does not have
much benefit beyond that resulting from its
1989 free trade agreement with the United
States.
Other studies use a partial equilibrium
analysis to examine the effects of NAFTA. That
is, they focus on particular sectors and assume
Figure 1
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Figure 2
U.S. Trade with the World, 
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that the rest of the economy is unaffected.
Determining NAFTA’s trade effects in this con-
text usually entails multiplying reduced-form
price elasticities (a measure of how price
changes translate into quantity changes) by the
expected changes in tariff and tariff-equivalent
trade barriers to determine how trade in various
sectors is likely to change. In 1993, the U.S.
International Trade Commission (USITC) com-
pleted a comprehensive study of NAFTA that
used reduced-form price elasticities to deter-
mine how much NAFTA would affect trade in
various U.S. economic sectors.
4 Hufbauer and
Schott (1993) discuss NAFTA in a broad context
and, based on their expectations of how trade
would change under NAFTA, estimate how jobs
in various sectors may be affected. They esti-
mate changes in the number of jobs using
Department of Commerce data on jobs sup-
ported directly and indirectly by exports to
Mexico in 1990. They find that NAFTA and
Mexico’s economic reforms would increase the
net number of U.S. jobs by about 170,000 in
1995 (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, 14).
In general, these partial equilibrium stud-
ies estimate that the United States will increase
its exports of high-tech goods, grains and
oilseed, and mechanical parts used in Mexican
assembly plants. Increases are projected for 
U.S. imports of automobiles, apparel, glassware,
household appliances, and certain horticultural
products.
NAFTA SINCE ITS IMPLEMENTATION
Unlike the studies cited above, which
have sought to predict how NAFTA will affect
trade, this article’s intent is to measure how
NAFTA has already affected it. To assess the
effects of NAFTA in its first three years, a model
of bilateral trade flows in North America is
empirically estimated with pre- and post-
NAFTA data. The analysis is based on a widely
used model of bilateral trade flows that
includes incomes, prices, and exchange rates
(see the box entitled “The Gravity Model of
Bilateral Trade”). Once the fundamental deter-
minants of trade flows are accounted for, any
extraordinary flows that have occurred since
NAFTA’s inception are attributed to the free
trade agreement.
5
This type of analysis has at least two bene-
fits. First, the analysis can estimate trade flows
utilizing data since NAFTA’s implementation.
Second, it can capture most of the potentially
important aspects of NAFTA, including tariff and
nontariff barrier reductions, as well as changes
in administrative rules, regulations, and expec-
tations about the sustainability of free trade that
cannot be easily quantified. Changing expecta-
tions for the sustainability of free trade under
NAFTA are potentially among the most impor-
tant aspects of the agreement. If NAFTA did not
create a credible commitment to free trade, new
investment would not flow into export indus-
tries to take advantage of reduced trade barriers.
Without a credible free trade agreement, the
benefits of the trade accord would be much
lower. Expectations for a more stable and open
trading environment affect trade by providing
the incentive for firms to make long-term capi-
tal commitments. These expectations cannot be
easily accounted for using the methodology
cited previously because it is difficult to  trans-
late them into price changes.
Of course, there are potential pitfalls to
this methodology as well. In particular, the
model is unlikely to control for all the factors
important to bilateral trade flows. Factors may
be attributed to NAFTA that should not be. For
example, when NAFTA took effect on January 1,
1994, political unrest was developing in Mexico,
resulting in the armed Zapatista movement 
and two political assassinations later that year.
Inasmuch as the uncertainty generated by this
unrest reduced trade, it would reduce the esti-
mated trade effects of NAFTA. Even though the
events are independent of NAFTA, they would
be indistinguishable in the context of the em-
pirical model. If political uncertainty could be
measured and included in the model, this
would not be a problem.
However, even if important economic or
political events are excluded from the model,
they may not bias the estimated NAFTA effects
if they and the accord’s implementation were
not simultaneous. Factors such as the peso 
crisis are unlikely to bias the analysis because
exchange rates and incomes (the two factors
most affected by the crisis) are included in 
the model. In other words, a majority of the
peso crisis’ effects on trade are likely to be
taken into account.
6 Still, because NAFTA was
implemented in a rather tumultuous period 
in Mexico that resulted in reduced trade, the
estimated effects of NAFTA may be biased
downward.
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF NAFTA
To assess the effects of NAFTA since its
implementation, the following benchmark
model of Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. bilateral
trade flows is estimated using quarterly dataFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       15 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1998
The Gravity Model of Bilateral Trade
The empirical bilateral trade model in this article is based on the gravity equation, which derives its
name from its resemblance to Newton’s law of gravity.The model was originally formulated from ad hoc
assumptions but had its intuitive appeal in describing trade flows as increasing as the economic “distance”
between two countries shrinks. It describes bilateral trade flows between two countries as a function of their
incomes, populations, the physical distance between them, and trade barriers. If countries with similar
incomes have similar preferences for goods but produce different types of products, they are likely to trade
more with each other than with other countries.Trade is also likely to increase the closer the countries 
are and the lower the trade barriers between them.The gravity model has been used to describe many 
different types of flows, such as immigration, shopping patterns, and car traffic, as well as interregional
trade. It has been used extensively in international trade applications because it provides an empirically
tractable framework.
The ad hoc assumptions behind the gravity equation have been replaced by microeconomic founda-
tions. Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand (1985), and Bikker (1987) have devel-
oped variants of the gravity model based on utility and profit maximization.The empirical model this article
uses is based on Bergstrand’s theoretical foundation for the gravity equation, which is based on the
assumption that producers maximize profits subject to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) tech-
nology, and consumers maximize a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function subject to a 
budget constraint (Bergstrand 1985). Assuming that individual bilateral trade flows are small relative to total
trade, the equation for bilateral trade is
where PXij is the value of aggregate trade flows from country i to country j,
Yi is the aggregate income of country i,
Yj is the aggregate income of country j,
Pik is the price received for country i’s product in the kth country,
P *
kj = PkjTkj/Ekj is the price paid for buying k’s product in the jth market,
Tij is 1 plus the ad valorem tariff rate on i’s product in the jth market,
Cij is a nontariff barrier on i’s product in the jth market,
Eij is the exchange rate between country j’s currency in terms of i’s currency,
g is the constant elasticity of transformation in the supply between different export goods (0 £ g £ ¥),
h is the CET between the supply of exports and domestically produced goods (0 £ h £ ¥),
s is the constant elasticity of substitution between the demand for different imported goods 
(0 £ s £ ¥), and
m is the CES between the demand for imported and domestic goods (0 £ m £ ¥).
As shown in Equation B.1, the value of aggregate trade flows from country i to country j depends on
nine terms. In the order of their appearance in the equation, they are (1) the income of the exporting 
country, (2) the income of the importing country, (3) tariffs, (4) nontariff barriers, (5) the exchange rate, 
(6) an export price index for exports to all countries to which the exporting country exports, (7) an import
price index for imports from all countries from which the importing country imports, (8) an index of domestic
prices for the exporting country, and (9) an index of domestic prices for the importing country.
These nine terms can be sorted into three categories: (1) income in the exporting and importing coun-
tries, which reflects the potential demand and supply; (2) wedges between the export and import price of
the traded goods due to tariffs and nontariff barriers; and (3) price terms reflecting the substitutability
between this traded good and the others.
Equation B.1 serves as the basis for the empirical model describing trade flows between the NAFTA
countries. Changes in tariff and nontariff barriers are proxied by a binary variable for NAFTA. Because
country-specific data for the price terms are not available, the empirical analysis uses proxies.To account
for the exchange rate, domestic prices, and the terms of trade between the bilateral trade partners, GDP
price deflators and the bilateral real exchange rate between the partners are used.To account for the terms
of trade with other trading partners, a multilateral real exchange rate with the rest of the world is used.
Economic events, such as the beginning of Mexico’s trade liberalization in 1985 and Canada’s free trade
agreement with the United States in 1989, are proxied by binary variables.
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from 1980 though 1996. The empirical equa-
tions are based on the gravity model, which 
is derived from standard microeconomic foun-
dations (Bergstrand 1985). All variables are 
seasonally adjusted quarterly data and are ex-
pressed in log first-differences (growth rates):
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The variables are defined as follows: M
ij is
country  i’s imports from country j; i and j are
either the United States, Canada, or Mexico; t
refers to the date; p and q are the number of
periods a variable is lagged; X
ij is country i’s
exports to country j; Y
i is real GDP of country
i; Y
j is real GDP of country j; P
i is country i’s
GDP price deflator; P
j is country j’s price de-
flator; E
ij is the real exchange rate between
countries i and j; E
iw is the real exchange rate
between country i and the world (excluding
country j); and D is a binary variable that rep-
resents changes in trade regimes not associated
with NAFTA. For trade with Mexico, D equals 1
beginning in 1985, the period in which Mexico
begins liberalizing trade. For trade between
Canada and the United States, D equals 1 begin-
ning in 1989, representing the period of the
U.S.–Canada free trade agreement. NAFTA is 
a binary variable representing the period in
which the accord was implemented. The vari-
able NAFTA equals 1 beginning the last quarter
of 1993.
8 a and b are estimated coefficients, and
e and m are error terms.
The variables in Equations 1 and 2 can 





t–q), which reflects the adjustment pro-
cess of trade to a new equilibrium; (2) income
in the exporting and importing countries (Y
j,
Y
i), which reflects the potential demand and
supply for the traded goods; (3) price and real





the substitutability of nontraded and traded
goods in the NAFTA countries and the rest of
the world; and (4) one-time trade liberalization
variables, reflecting changes in trade regimes
and NAFTA (D, NAFTA).
The size and statistical significance of the
coefficient on the NAFTA variable tell us the
degree to which NAFTA affects bilateral trade
flows in North America.
9 It should be noted that
NAFTA is not scheduled to be fully imple-
mented until 2009. Tariff rates in many sectors
are to be reduced over a fifteen-year period (see
the box entitled “What Has NAFTA Done?”).
Consequently, these results should be seen as a
preliminary look into NAFTA’s effects on aggre-
gate trade.
The estimated equations are in the appen-
dix.
10 Overall, the equations explain the growth
of trade relatively well.
11 However, the effects of
NAFTA on trade flows (in size and statistical sig-
nificance) vary a great deal between countries.
Figures 3 through 8 show what the estimation
results imply for actual exports and imports
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
The shaded bands on both sides of trade esti-
mated without NAFTA represent a 90 percent
confidence interval derived from the statistical
error of the estimate.
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The United States and Mexico
Figures 3 and 4 show NAFTA’s estimated
effects on bilateral trade flows between the
United States and Mexico. As the dotted line in
Figure 3 indicates, U.S. exports are estimated to
have grown faster than they would have had
there not been a trade agreement. On average,
U.S. export growth is about 16.3 percentage
points higher per year with NAFTA. While the
increase in growth is not extraordinary, the
cumulative effect is about $21.3 billion more in
exports than what would have occurred without
NAFTA. The statistical significance of this effect
is high, as shown by the 90 percent confidence
interval lines that exclude the observed data on
U.S. exports to Mexico.
For U.S. imports, as shown in Figure 4, 
the boost from NAFTA is also relatively high. 
On average, import growth is about 16.2 per-
centage points higher per year with NAFTA. 
Since NAFTA became law, the cumulate impact
amounts to about $20.5 billion in additional
imports because of the agreement. However,
NAFTA’s statistical significance for U.S. imports
from Mexico is only marginal. The 90 percent
confidence interval lines show that we can-
not exclude the possibility that trade without 
NAFTA would have been different from trade
with NAFTA.
The United States and Canada
Figures 5 and 6 show the estimated effects
of NAFTA on bilateral trade flows between the
United States and Canada. As both figures show,
trade between the two countries has not been
affected much by NAFTA. This is not surprising,
given that a free trade agreement with Canada
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that accord significantly. However, even the
1989 agreement, as measured by the binary
variable  D
ij in the U.S.–Canada trade equations,
does not seem to play a strong role in deter-
mining trade flows. Although trade may have
been liberalized in some sectors, aggregate
trade does not seem to be influenced much.
13
This may be because trade between the coun-
tries has been generally open for some time.
Figures 5 and 6 show an 8.6 percent average
annual increase in U.S. exports to Canada and a
3.9 percent increase in U.S. imports from Canada
due to NAFTA. The NAFTA effect on both ex-
ports and imports is statistically insignificant.
Canada and Mexico
The effects of NAFTA on exports and
imports between Canada and Mexico appear in
Figures 7 and 8. As the figures show, the esti-
mated effects are very imprecise, with a wide,
90 percent confidence band. One possible rea-
son for the difficulty in measuring the effects of
NAFTA in these equations is that trade between
Canada and Mexico is a very small share of each
country’s total and is subject to much more
unexplained volatility than is trade with the
United States.
14 In these equations, the NAFTA
trade effects are estimated to be negative, which
raises the possibility that NAFTA may have
diverted Canadian–Mexican trade toward the
United States or other countries. But because
the effects are so imprecise, the possibility that
the effects are zero or even positive cannot be
excluded.
In summary, it is important to remember that
there is a wide statistical margin of error for
most of the estimated NAFTA trade effects, so
they should be viewed in relative rather than abso-
Figure 3
U.S. Exports to Mexico
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Figure 4
U.S. Imports from Mexico
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Figure 5
U.S. Exports to Canada
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Statistics; author’s calculations.
Figure 6
U.S. Imports from Canada

















SOURCES: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
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lute terms. While it is likely that NAFTA affected
U.S.–Mexican trade, it is unlikely that it affected
U.S.–Canadian or Canadian–Mexican trade.
TRADE DIVERSION VERSUS TRADE CREATION
To judge NAFTA’s effects on the
economies of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States, it is also important to consider North
American trade flows in the context of trade
with the rest of the world. In other words, did
NAFTA create new trade opportunities within
North America, or did it simply divert trade from
countries outside NAFTA? If the increased trade
caused by NAFTA was simply a shuffling of
trade from other, more efficient trading partners,
then NAFTA’s benefit would shrink. Although a
detailed examination of this issue is not within
the scope of this article, a glance at how the dis-
tribution of trade flows has changed since
NAFTA can tell us whether the accord may be
associated with trade diversion.
Figure 9 shows how the distribution of
trade flows between the NAFTA countries and
the rest of the world changed from 1993, the
year before NAFTA began, to 1996, three years
after NAFTA started. As the figure shows, trade
within North America has increased relative to
trade with the rest of the world, but the increase
is slight. The share of U.S. trade with Canada
and Mexico increased from 27.8 to 29.4 percent
between 1993 and 1996, with most of that
increase attributed to greater U.S. trade with
Mexico. Canadian trade with the rest of North
America also increased, from a share of 77.3 
to 80.4 percent. Mexico’s trade share with 
North America changed very little, from 71 to
71.6 percent.
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The share of total trade between the
NAFTA countries slightly increased, suggesting
that if there was trade diversion, it was small.
But to determine the extent of trade diversion in
North America, it is also important to consider
whether increased trade between NAFTA coun-
tries came at the expense of trade with the rest
of the world. In other words, did NAFTA shift
trade away from countries outside of NAFTA, or
did NAFTA simply increase trade within North
America at a faster rate than trade increased
with the rest of the world? Figure 10 shows that
it was the latter; that is, trade with countries out-
side North America also grew after NAFTA’s
implementation. The share of total trade
between North American countries increased
Figure 7
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Figure 8
Canadian Imports from Mexico

















SOURCES: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
Statistics; author’s calculations.
Figure 9
Trade Shares of NAFTA Countries, 
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because trade within North America grew faster
than did trade with countries outside of North
America. Consequently, although trade diver-
sion is a possibility, it is unlikely to be a large
problem. Moreover, because trade under
NAFTA was liberalized between countries with
very different comparative advantages, it is
unlikely that it caused a shift from optimal 
trading patterns.
HAS NAFTA BEEN A SUCCESS?
Certainly, NAFTA is not the solution to all
the economic problems that ail North America,
but it is not the disaster that critics claimed it
would be. NAFTA is foremost a free trade agree-
ment, and as such its benefits derive from a shift
in resources to industries that reflect a nation’s
comparative advantage and away from indus-
What Has NAFTA Done?
Figure 10
Trade with the World as a Share of GDP
(Excluding trade between NAFTA countries)
Percent
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SOURCES: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade
Statistics and International Financial Statistics.
On January 1,1994, NAFTA substantially reduced trade barri-
ers across a market with more than 380 million people and a com-
bined gross domestic product of roughly $7.6 trillion. Although
trade barriers have already been lowered significantly, NAFTA will
not be completely phased in until 2009. Most of the declines in tar-
iffs have been on the Mexican side because Mexico started with
higher tariffs than the United States or Canada. In 1992, Mexican
tariffs on imports from the United States averaged about 10 per-
cent when weighted by the value imported; at the same time, U.S.
tariffs on imports from Mexico averaged about 4 percent. Because
Canada and the United States negotiated a separate free trade
agreement in 1989, NAFTA affected trade between the two coun-
tries very little.
NAFTA substantially reduces, but does not eliminate, nontariff
trade barriers, such as import quotas, sanitary regulations, and
licensing requirements. Canada and the United States traditionally
have had few restrictions on capital flows, whereas Mexican laws
prohibited private ownership in the petroleum industry and parts of
the petrochemical industry, restricted foreign investment in the
financial and insurance sectors, and institutionalized communal
ownership of agricultural lands.The petroleum industry is still off-
limits to foreign investment, although parts of the petrochemical
industry are set to be privatized. Many laws against foreign invest-
ment in the financial and insurance sectors have been eliminated
or substantially reduced. Although NAFTA set a schedule for liber-
alizing the banking sector, the 1995 peso crisis helped generate
the political momentum to speed the opening of this sector by
decreasing the restrictions on foreign ownership of existing banks.
NAFTA has not been without glitches, but the problems are
probably fewer than what they would have been without the agree-
ment.The opening of trucking between the United States and
Mexico has been delayed, and tariffs have increased for some
products.The United States levied additional tariffs on Mexican
straw brooms, and in response Mexico levied tariffs on U.S. alco-
holic beverages, flat glass, notebooks, and some types of wood
furniture.There have also been disputes over agricultural products,
such as avocados and tomatoes. Although these disputes are trou-
blesome, their effect on overall trade has been small. Moreover,
NAFTA may have limited a protectionist response to the 1995 peso
crisis. Unlike Mexico’s 1982 crisis, when the Mexican government
raised tariffs dramatically in the hope of generating a trade surplus
to boost foreign reserves, during the 1995 crisis no such political
response occurred.
Here are some specifics by sector on how NAFTA has
reduced trade barriers.1
Automobiles
NAFTA immediately decreased Mexican tariffs on automobiles
from 20 to 10 percent in 1994 and is set to drop them to zero by
2004.Tariffs on most auto parts will be eliminated by 1999.The
agreement includes rules of origin specifying that to qualify for
preferential tariff treatment, vehicles must have 62.5 percent North
American content, which is an increase over the 50 percent provi-
sion in the U.S.–Canadian free trade agreement.
By 2004 NAFTA eliminates requirements that automakers
supplying the Mexican market produce the cars in Mexico and buy
Mexican parts. It has already eliminated mandatory export quotas
on foreign-owned auto manufacturing facilities in Mexico, and by
1999 it eliminates the Mexican restriction on bus and truck imports.
Textiles and Apparel
NAFTA immediately eliminated trade barriers on more than 20
percent of Mexican–U.S. trade in textiles and apparel. Over six
years it eliminates barriers on another 60 percent.The accord’s
rules of origin require that, to receive NAFTA tariff preferences,
apparel be manufactured in North America from the yarn-spinning
state forward.
Agriculture
NAFTA immediately reduced tariffs to zero for half of U.S.
agricultural exports to Mexico.The other half of agricultural goods
tariffs are to be eliminated by 2009. NAFTA immediately eliminated
Mexico’s licensing requirements for grains, dairy, and poultry.
Financial Services
NAFTA immediately reduced, and will eliminate by 2000,
Mexico’s restrictions on Canadian and U.S. ownership and provi-
sion of commercial banking, insurance, securities trading, and
other financial services. Under NAFTA, Canadian and U.S. financial
firms are allowed to establish wholly owned subsidiaries in Mexico
and to engage in the same range of activities as similar Mexican
firms.
1 Much of the following is described in Kehoe and Kehoe (1994).20
tries that do not. It is important to understand
that this shift implies that the benefits come
from both increased imports and exports.
Accordingly, the best way to judge a free trade
agreement is by whether it increases imports
and exports, and not by whether it increases
exports and decreases imports. By this criterion,
NAFTA has been a success for the United States
and Mexico. As expected, NAFTA has meant 
little for the Canadian economy.
After accounting for the effects of eco-
nomic variables important to bilateral trade
flows—such as income, exchange rates, and
prices—NAFTA is found to have a significant
positive effect on trade flows between the
United States and Mexico. NAFTA is not found
to have a significant impact on trade between
the United States and Canada or Canada and
Mexico. These findings are not surprising, given
that the United States negotiated a free trade
agreement with Canada five years before the
implementation of NAFTA and that most of the
trade liberalized under NAFTA is between the
United States and Mexico.
Although this empirical analysis controls
for economic shocks that would affect trade
through changes in incomes and exchange
rates, such as the 1995 peso crisis, it cannot con-
trol for all external shocks, nor can it capture all
aspects of NAFTA’s influence on trade. Perhaps
the largest omission from the analysis is trade
barriers that were not erected because of the
free trade agreement but would have been 
without it. This issue was particularly relevant
during the 1995 peso crisis. Unlike previous
periods of economic turmoil in Mexico, trade
was relatively unimpeded during the peso crisis.
NAFTA, by enhancing the economic ties
between the North American countries, may
have limited a protectionist response to the
peso crisis and helped facilitate a return of 
foreign investment and economic growth to
Mexico.
Has NAFTA destroyed U.S. jobs? Clearly,
NAFTA has neither spelled the death of the 
U.S. workforce, nor has it generated a dramatic
increase in the number of U.S. jobs. What
dominates the employment picture in any year
are movements in a country’s own business
cycle, not trade. U.S. income grew fairly
smoothly between 1994 and 1996; as a result,
U.S. employment grew by 3.6 million. In con-
trast, Mexico experienced a currency crisis and
deep recession in 1995; its employment fell 
but is now recovering with the economy.
Ultimately, freer trade does not determine the
number of jobs available in a country, but it
does determine the types of jobs available. 
In the three years since NAFTA’s implementa-
tion, there has been a clear trend toward
increased trade in North America and higher
productivity in the United States. How much of
that greater productivity is due to NAFTA is
unknown. As time passes, and more economic
data become available, cyclical factors and 
economic shocks will fall to the background
and a clearer picture of NAFTA’s effects on the
economy will emerge.
NOTES
I thank Baoyuan Wang for excellent research assis-
tance, and Evan Koenig, Bill Gruben, and Lori Taylor
for their comments and suggestions. Any remaining
errors are my own.
1 The early controversy can perhaps be best summa-
rized by quotes from Ross Perot and President Bill
Clinton during the NAFTA debate in 1993: “NAFTA will
pit American and Mexican workers in a race to the
bottom. In this race, millions of Americans will lose
their jobs” (Perot 1993, i); “I believe the Nafta will 
create 200,000 American jobs in the first two years 
of its effect” (Clinton 1993).
2 See, for example, Gould (1996), Weintraub (1997), and
USITC (1997).
3 For an excellent survey of general equilibrium models
applied to NAFTA, see Kehoe and Kehoe (1994).
4 In creating the reduced-form price elasticities, the
USITC study assumes that foreign and domestic
goods are imperfect substitutes for each other. In 
other words, the goods have separate markets in
which equilibrium prices and quantities are estab-
lished. See USITC (1993) for a description of this
methodology.
5 The methodology used here is an extension of the
work done by Gould (1996). Other recent studies have
used a similar methodology to assess the trade and
sectoral effects of NAFTA. See USITC (1997).
6 See Gould (1996) for an assessment of how the peso
crisis affected trade independent of NAFTA. See Neely
(1996) for a discussion of why NAFTA did not cause
Mexico’s peso crisis.
7 Log first-differences, as opposed to a simple log-linear
relationship, were used because tests on the depen-
dent and many of the independent variables could not
reject the hypothesis of nonstationarity. Consequently,
the equations estimate the growth of exports and
imports.
8 Because trade growth equations are estimated, the
effects of NAFTA are assumed to influence the growth
of trade. However, according to traditional long-run
models of trade, lower tariffs only influence the level,
not the growth, of trade. Because trade is unlikely to
jump to a new, higher level instantaneously, the growth
of trade is likely to be affected in the transition to aFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       21 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1998
new, higher level. This is especially true for the short
period that NAFTA has been observed and because
NAFTA is being phased in over fifteen years.
9 NAFTA may also affect bilateral trade flows indirectly
through income and prices. Although these indirect
effects are likely to be important over the long run,
over the short run these effects are probably small.
Because of this, these secondary effects are ignored
in the estimation.
10 The equations were estimated with ordinary least
squares and the errors terms checked to see if they
follow a white-noise pattern. The lag structure of the
equations was determined according to the Akaike
information criterion. To determine how trade would
have grown without NAFTA, the estimated NAFTA
effect was excluded from the estimated exports and
imports equations, and trade flows were calculated
with the actual data for the independent variables. To
provide the best estimates, the error term (which
reflects the degree to which the equation does not
match the data) was included in the calculation. Data
sources are given in the appendix.
11 The adjusted R
2 on the equations varies from 0.67 in 
the U.S.–Mexico export equation to 0.18 in the
Canada–Mexico import equation. Most of the equa-
tions have an R
2 between 0.30 to 0.40, which is not
uncommon for similar growth equations. The adjusted
R
2 measures the proportion of the variation in the left-
side dependent variable that is explained by the right-
side dependent variables, adjusting for the number of
variables in the equation.
12 The confidence interval shows the degree of certainty
we can have in the estimated effects. If the confidence
interval around the estimated effects of trade without
NAFTA excludes the actual observed trade under
NAFTA, we can say with 90 percent certainty that
trade with NAFTA is different from trade without it. 
If the 90 percent confidence interval includes the
observed trade under NAFTA, we can say that there is
less than a 90 percent certainty that trade is different
with NAFTA than without it.
13 An inherent problem in studying aggregate exports
and imports is that the analysis cannot explain
changes in sector-specific trade flows caused by
NAFTA. For example, imports in one industry may
expand, while imports in another industry may con-
tract. In aggregate, however, imports overall would
appear to remain stable. An attempt was made to
study sector-specific trade data, but because equiva-
lent sector-specific price information across countries
does not exist, the empirical results were poor.
14 This is indicated by the relatively low adjusted R
2 of
the Canada–Mexico trade equations.
15 A bilateral trade intensity index, defined as the share
of country j’s trade in country i’s world trade relative to
the share of country i’s world trade in total world trade
[Iij = (Tij/Tiw)/(Tjw/Tw)], also shows a slight increase
among NAFTA partners since 1993. See Yeats (1997)
for a discussion of this index applied to Mercosur’s
trade.
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variable Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Constant term .027 –.061 –.025 –.029 –.229 .169
(.794) (.713) (.688) (.078) (.224) (.042)
Lagged dependent –.679 –.901 –.441 –.209 –.299 –.323
variable (.074) (.050) (.659) (.098) (.341) (.012)
Y
i 3.623 .289 3.953 2.793 9.474 2.560
(.031) (.209) (.334) (.135) (.366) (.543)
Y
j .082 –3.046 –1.095 .104 3.677 .335
(.050) (.539) (.394) (.425) (.255) (.841)
E
ij –2.147 –.610 –.171 .178 –.863 –.435
(.000) (.317) (.536) (.427) (.053) (.181)
E
iw –2.971 –.061 –2.062 –.418 6.748 5.742
(.047) (.316) (.430) (.665) (.497) (.007)
P
i .963 13.716 3.438 4.208 –17.100 –5.847
(.616) (.292) (.106) (.009) (.384) (.149)
P
j –.533 –.191 .477 –.877 –1.185 –.890
(.704) (.608) (.724) (.578) (.368) (.099)
D
ij –.029 .026 –.005 .008 –.008 –.003
(.522) (.722) (.825) (.550) (.951) (.994)
NAFTA .073 .072 .031 .018 –.111 –.038
(.015) (.119) (.191) (.374) (.240) (.453)
Adjusted R
2 .67 .35 .36 .31 .27 .18
Equation F statistic .000 .030 .080 .002 .120 .050
(significance level)
LM test for autocorrelation .31 .53 .20 .25 .01 .24
(significance level)
Lag structure 3 5 5 1 4 1
Degrees of freedom 30 14 18 50 22 46
NOTE: Coefficients are the sum of the lagged terms. Significance level of F statistics (the null hypothesis that all lagged










Seasonally adjusted value of merchan-
dise imports, in millions of U.S. dollars
Seasonally adjusted value of merchan-
dise exports, in millions of U.S. dollars
Seasonally adjusted GDP price deflator
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Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, and
author’s calculations
Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, and
author’s calculations